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Legal and Ethical Responsibilities
Following Brain Death
TheMcMath andMuñoz Cases
Death is imbued with social, cultural, and religious
meaning. From a legal and scientific perspective, how-
ever, death is adefinableevent.Apatient’sdeathmakes
it possible, even obligatory, to cease treatment and en-
ables theharvestingof organs for transplantation toex-
tend life forothers. Theclear linebetween life anddeath
is importantbecausephysicianswill not squanderscarce
medical resources or violate medical ethics by impos-
ing treatment after the patient is dead. With a clear di-
agnosis, familymembers can also accept the death of a
loved one and begin the process of mourning.
The concept of coma dépassé (“a state beyond
coma”) emerged in 1959,1 followed in 1968byanadhoc
HarvardMedical School committee’s classicdefinitionof
“irreversible comaasanewcriterion fordeath.”2 In 1981,
a presidential commission solidified clinical and ethical
recognitionofbraindeathdefinedbyneurologiccriteria.3
In 1981, the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform
DeterminationofDeathAct,whichdefinedbrain death
consistentlywith thepresident’s commission.4All states
have followed the model act, although 2 states—New
Jersey andNewYork—require hospitals to consider the
family’s religiousormoral views indetermininga course
of action after brain death. Clinicians, except in these 2
states, do not have to consult the family before with-
drawing ventilation. Although state statutes do not
specify clinical criteria, the medical literature has care-
fully described the clinical neurologic examination.
TwoAgonizing Brain Death Cases
Although the clinician’s clinical and ethical responsibili-
ties following a confirmed brain death diagnosis ap-
pearedwell settled, 2 evolving cases recently captured
intense public attention. Physicians at Children’s Hos-
pital in Oakland, California, pronounced Jahi McMath,
age 13, brain dead on December 12, 2013, but her par-
ents obtained a temporary restraining order to prevent
the hospital from withdrawing her from a ventilator. A
court-appointed neurologist confirmed the diagnosis,
but the courtmediatedanagreement to transfer Jahi to
a facility that is sustaining her physiologic functions
through ventilation and percutaneous endoscopic
gastrostomy.5 Jahi’s parents have responded in a hu-
manway—aprolongedheartbeathas led to a falsehope
of recovery. A beating heart is also seen as the key ele-
ment fordefiningdeath incertain religiousorcultural tra-
ditions. However, whilemedication and ventilator sup-
port can sustain a heartbeat and respiration, a beating
heart isnotsufficientcriterion forcontinued lifeoncethe
brain has lost all functionality.
PhysiciansatJohnPeterSmithHospital inFortWorth,
Texas, declaredMarliseMuñoz, age 33, brain dead in late
November2013(thehospitalhasnotconfirmedthediag-
nosis,citingprivacyconcerns).Atthetime,thepatientwas
14 weeks pregnant. Respecting Ms Muñoz’s wishes, her
husbandandparentsinstructedthehospitaltoremoveher
fromventilation. The hospital, however, refused to com-
plywith the request, citingaTexas statuteproscribing re-
moval of “life sustaining treatment” from a pregnant pa-
tient. At least 31 states have similar statutes, which offer
varying degrees of fetal protection. Texas is among 12
states with the most restrictive laws, which requires life
support irrespective of the duration of the pregnancy.6
However, even in Texas, the law arguablywould be inap-
plicabletoMsMuñozbecauseabrain-deadindividualcan-
not, by definition, be on “life” support. Seen in this way,
such lawswould apply to patients in a persistent vegeta-
tive state but not those who are legally dead. Texas law,
moreover, states, “theperson is deadwhen,…according
toordinarystandardsofmedicalpractice, there is irrevers-
iblecessationofall spontaneousbrainfunction.Deathoc-
curswhen the relevant functions cease.”7
Inmid-January,MrMuñoz sought a federal court or-
der to remove hiswife from the ventilator and to declare
the Texas fetal protection statute unconstitutional. He
claims the statute does not apply in cases of brain death,
infringeshiswife’s right tomaketreatmentdecisions,and
violates equal protection of the laws by treating preg-
nantwomendifferently than other patients.8
Atone level, theMcMathandMuñozcasesbearstrik-
ingsimilaritybecausethehospital, or thestate, isdefying
the family’swishes.However, thecasesaremarkedlydis-
similar,withone family striving tokeeptheirdaughteron
aventilatorandtheotherendeavoringtogivethepatient
dignity indeath.Bothcases involveanattempttoprotect
apatient’s interest (if it is possible for adeceasedperson
to have cognizable interests). However, in one case the
parents are seeking solely to safeguard the individual’s
interest. In theother case, the interests of thedeceased
woman are in conflictwith those of the fetus—the abor-
tioncontroversyat theoppositeendof the lifespectrum.
Differentiating Brain Death From a Persistent
Vegetative State
Thecontroversysurroundinglife-sustainingtreatmenthas
beenthoroughlyexamined inhighlyvisiblecases, suchas
Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan, and Terri Schiavo. Al-
though there remains considerable disagreement on the
moral and religious aspects, from a legal perspective the
courtshaverecognizedtherightofpatientstodecline life-
sustaining treatment, as well as the power of surrogates
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toexpresstheviewsofonce-competentpatients,ortoact intheirbest
interests. This would apply both to imposing unwanted life-
sustainingtreatmentandtodiscontinuingthattreatment. Inshort, the
courtshaveaffirmed the rights toautonomyand toadignifieddeath,
consistentwith the patient’s knownwishes.
These cases, however, have involved individuals in a persis-
tent vegetative state. These patients were alive, with clear inter-
ests in determining the course of their treatment. TheMcMath and
Muñozcases arequitedistinct in thatbothof these individuals have
been declared legally dead. Once a patient has died, any conversa-
tion about the appropriate form of medical treatment is no longer
relevant. This would mean, for example, that while Jahi’s mother
could ask for ventilation for a short duration to enable her to come
to termswithherdaughter’s death, thevery ideaof “treatment,” es-
pecially if it is of an indefinite duration, would be well beyond the
bounds of prevailing ethical or legal thought.
TheMeaning of Autonomy
Considerablevariationexists in theapplicationof thebioethical value
ofautonomy.Theclassicunderstanding is that individualshavearight
todeterminewhether theywill acceptmedical treatment.Autonomy
in this sense vindicates an individual’s right of bodily integrity. Unless
other interests are at stake (eg, a significant risk of transmission of an
infectiousdisease),physiciansmaynot imposetreatmentwithoutthe
individual’s informedconsent.Thelawalsoauthorizessurrogatestoex-
ercise thepatient’s right todeclinetreatment inaccordancewithapa-
tient’s advancedirectiveor best interests.
This classicunderstandingofautonomy isoftenextendedto the
inverse case; if patients or their surrogates can decline treatment,
it is argued, they can also affirmatively demand treatment—even if
treatment isnotclinically indicatedorcost-effective.Thus,Jahi’s fam-
ily claims the right to ventilation and artificial nutrition for a de-
ceased person. The family’s claim implicitly requires physicians to
violate their ethical responsibilities by treating a dead person.
Surrogateswhoassert the right todemand treatmentoftendo
sowithout regard towhowill pay—the family, the state, or the hos-
pital throughuncompensated care. The costs of long-termhospital
care, moreover, can be substantial. At the same time, the family is
demanding theexpenditureof inherently scarce resources, suchas
hospital beds, ventilators, and clinician time—resources that could
beused toprovideeffective treatment for otherpatients. For these
reasons, the value of autonomy should not be co-opted to permit
familymembers toaffirmatively requirehealthprofessionals topro-
vide costly treatment absent any benefit.
Whose Interests: TheWoman or Her Fetus?
TheclaimassertedbytheMuñozfamily isof themoreclassickind—an
exercise of autonomy to protect the bodily integrity of the indi-
vidual. In essence, the family is claiming the right to decline medi-
cal interventions, asexpressedbythepatient’s formerwishes. In this
case, the state appears to be violating 2 interests: the individual’s
interest in a dignified death and burial and the physician’s interest
in acting ethically by not treating a dead patient.
There is a clash between thewoman’s clear interest in not hav-
ing treatment thrustuponher and the state’s interests in safeguard-
ing the life of the fetus. How should society reconcile these 2 inter-
ests that stand in suchstark tension?Therearenoclear answers,but
only questions: when does life begin, how should it be valued, and
whose choice should prevail (the woman’s or the state’s). The an-
swers to thesequestionshaveseriouslydivided themedical andpo-
litical communities and the public.
The Muñoz case has additional important features. First, at 14
weeks’gestation, thefetuswouldnotbeviableoutsidethewomband
thewoman’s right toterminatethepregnancywouldbeconstitution-
ally protected. Second, assuming her parents’ account is accurate,
MsMuñoz is legallydead,whichcalls intoquestion if theTexasstatute
thatprohibitsremovalof life-sustainingtreatmentfromapregnantpa-
tient even applies. If it does, then the statewould be instructing phy-
sicianstotreatadeadpatient;shehasdeclinedtreatmentthroughher
surrogate.Thestate,ineffect, isinsistingonventilatingthewomansolely
togestatethefetus.Third,giventhe lengthof timeMsMuñozwasde-
prived of oxygen, the continued viability of the fetus is uncertain and
the fetusmay havemajor impairments. Given her husband’s feelings
thathiswife shouldnotbeartificially sustained, it is uncertainhowhe
wouldfeelabout raisingthe infant.Shouldthestatebeable tocompel
treatmentofabrain-deadwomaninthesecircumstances,particularly
giventhehusband’sdistressandwishtogivehiswifeadignifiedburial?
A Long History of Settled Ethics and Law
Given the extensive history of scientific, ethical, and legal under-
standings of patient autonomy and a dignified death, aswell as the
clear line between life and death, it seems surprising that the
MuñozandMcMathcaseshavegeneratedsuch interest.Atone level,
the outcome of these cases seems so clear—both individuals have
died and they have a right to a dignified burial; and the physician’s
ethical responsibilities totreatarefinished.Atanother level, thesheer
symbolism of a beating heart, together with the human emotions
of a lovingparentor spouse, suggest that thesekindsof cases at the
intersection of law, ethics, andmedicine will continue.
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